Environmental severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) contamination in hospital rooms during the first and third coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) waves.

We investigated the frequency, distribution, and risk factors of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) environmental contamination around infected patients during the first and third wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. The shedding of SARS-CoV-2 in rooms of infected patients was limited in our hospital setting.

Outbreak of OXA-48-producing Enterobacterales in a haematological ward associated with an uncommon environmental reservoir, France, 2016 to 2019.

The hospital water environment, including the wastewater drainage system, is increasingly reported as a potential reservoir for carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales (CPE). We investigated a persistent outbreak of OXA-48 CPE (primarily Citrobacter freundii) in a haematological ward of a French teaching hospital by epidemiological, microbiological and environmental methods. Between January 2016 and June 2019, we detected 37 new OXA-48 CPE-colonised and/or ­infected patients in the haematological ward. In October 2017, a unit dedicated to CPE-colonised and/or ­infected patients was created. Eleven additional sporadic acquisitions were identified after this date without any obvious epidemiological link between patients, except in one case. Environmental investigations of the haematological ward (June-August 2018) identified seven of 74 toilets and one of 39 drains positive for OXA-48 CPE (seven C. freundii, one Enterobacter sakazakii, one Escherichia coli). Whole genome comparisons identified a clonal dissemination of OXA-48-producing C. freundii from the hospital environment to patients. In addition to strict routine infection control measures, an intensive cleaning programme was performed (descaling and bleaching) and all toilet bowls and tanks were changed. These additional measures helped to contain the outbreak. This study highlights that toilets can be a possible source of transmission of OXA-48 CPE.

Transmission of Legionnaires' Disease through Toilet Flushing.

We describe 2 cases of healthcare-associated Legionnaires' disease in patients in France hospitalized 5 months apart in the same room. Whole-genome sequencing analyses showed that clinical isolates from the patients and isolates from the room's toilet clustered together. Toilet contamination by Legionella pneumophila could lead to a risk for exposure through flushing.

Protracted outbreak of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii after intercontinental transfer of colonized patients.

OBJECTIVE: To describe the course and management of a protracted outbreak after intercontinental transfer of 2 patients colonized with multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (MDRAB). DESIGN: An 18-month outbreak investigation. SETTING: An 860-bed university hospital in France. PATIENTS: Case patients (ie, carriers) were those colonized or infected with an MDRAB isolate. METHODS: During the epidemic period, all intensive care unit (ICU) patients and contacts of carriers who were transferred to wards were screened for MDRAB carriage. Contact precautions, environmental screening, and auditing of healthcare worker (HCW) practices were implemented; rooms were cleaned with hydrogen peroxide mist disinfection. One ICU, in which most of the cases occurred, was closed on 4 occasions for thorough cleaning and disinfection. RESULTS: The 2 index case patients were identified as 2 patients who carried the same MDRAB strain and who were admitted to the hospital after repatriation from Tahiti 5 months apart. During an 18-month period, a total of 84 secondary cases occurred. Reintroduction of MDRAB into the ICUs occurred from patients previously colonized or from healthcare personnel. Termination of the outbreak was only achieved when all carriers from wards or the ICU were cohorted to an isolation unit with dedicated healthcare personnel. CONCLUSIONS: Intercontinental transfer of carriers of MDRAB can result in extensive outbreaks and serious disruption of the hospital's organization. Transmission from carriers most likely occurred via the hands of HCWs, poor cleaning protocols, airborne spread, and contaminated water from sink traps. This protracted outbreak was controlled only after implementation of an extensive control program and eventual cohorting of all carriers in an isolation unit with dedicated healthcare personnel.